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SPONSORSHIP STRATEGY: A REPLY TO FLOYD ABRAMS
AND PROFESSOR SAKS
PAUL L. COLBY*
ROBERT H. KLONOFF**
In our book Sponsorship Strategy,' we presented an overarching
theory of trial advocacy that challenged entrenched conventional
wisdom. Most notably, contrary to the widely held view that "there
is no 'right way' to try cases, "2 we announced a series of tactical
rules to govern virtually every decision a trial lawyer must make.3 At
the same time, we criticized existing trial advocacy treatises for their
erroneous advice, overemphasis on style rather than tactics, and
their lack of any overarching theory.4 In preparing our work, we
expected to receive harsh criticism. Such criticism is commonplace
for a book that challenges the foundations of long-accepted views.5
A recent issue of the Yale Law Journal included two critical re-
views of our book-one by Floyd Abrams,6 a well-known practi-
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** Partner, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C. J.D., Yale University.
Former Assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States; former Assistant United
States Attorney; former Visiting Professor of Law, University of San Diego.
1. ROBERT H. KLONOFF & PAUL L. COLBY, SPONSORSHIP STRATEGY: EVIDENTIARY
TACTICS FOR WINNING JURY TRIALS (1990).
2. THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES XiX (2d ed. 1988).
3. See KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 1, at 152-53 (summarizing the process of evi-
dence selection advocated by Sponsorship Strategy).
4. See KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 1, at 12-13. First, we noted that most trial
manuals "treat each phase of the trial as sui generis," providing rules, observations and
anecdotes that apply only to the phase of the trial under discussion rather than provid-
ing "overarching principles." Id. at 12. Secondly, we suggested that advising attorneys
to bring out the weaknesses in their own cases-rather than letting their opponents do
so-is "counterproductive." Id. Thirdly, we observed that many manuals "devote more
attention to matters of etiquette and personal style than to tactical issues." Id. at 13.
5. See, e.g., Bernard Barber, Resistance by Scientists to Scientific Discovery, 134 SCIENCE
596 (1961) (discussing the "constant phenomenon" of resistance by scientists to scien-
tific discovery).
6. Floyd Abrams, Trial Tactics: Sponsorship Costs of the Adversary System, 101 YALE L.
1159 (1992).
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tioner, the other by Professor Michael Saks,7 an academic in the
field ofjury studies. Both reviewers devoted large portions of their
reviews to considering whether evidence exists to disprove the
book's theory.
Abrams called attention to a case he personally defended' in
order to demonstrate how the plaintiff's counsel erred in applying a
tactic our theory endorses.' What Abrams did not highlight, how-
ever, is that the multimillion dollar jury verdict against Abrams's cli-
ent was historic in magnitude.'" Professor Saks discussed various
empirical studies but admitted that they do not disprove the the-
ory." Relying instead on supposed canons of "behavioral sci-
ence,""2 he undertook to expose the theory as methodologically
flawed."3 Surprisingly, however, Saks invoked methodological prin-
ciples discredited in the scientific community more than a century
ago.
Both reviewers, therefore, did nothing to advance their criti-
cism of our theory. As we show in this Response, Abrams and
Saks-despite their sweeping denouncements-demonstrated only
that they feel threatened by any effort to lift trial advocacy out of its
primitive state.
I.
According to Abrams, the "unpersuasiveness" of Sponsorship
Strategy's basic premises is "best seen" by examining the approach
advanced by our book that challenges the conventional wisdom:
rather than highlighting weaknesses in one's own case, force the
other side to elicit the potentially damaging facts and assume the
burden of convincing the jury that those facts are material. 4
Abrams selected three cases to "test" that aspect of the book.' 5
A libel case involving Wayne Newton 16 was the only one of
these examples drawn from Abrams's own jury trial experience
7. Michael J. Saks, Flying Blind in the Courtroom: Trying Cases Without Knowing What
Works or Why, 101 YALE L.J. 1177 (1992).
8. Newton v. NBC, 930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 192 (1991).
9. See Abrams, supra note 6, at 1172-74; infra notes 16-28 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 24, 43.
11. See Saks, supra note 7, at 1190 n.65 ("On the other hand, there is no evidence
that conventional wisdom provides better results [than sponsorship theory] in trials.").
12. Saks, supra note 7, at 1182.
13. Id.
14. Abrams, supra note 6, at 1163.
15. Id. at 1165-74.
16. Id. at 1172-74; Newton v. NBC, 930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 192 (1991).
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(which is apparently quite limited). 7 In that case, Newton sued
NBC over a broadcast that linked him to two organized-crime
figures. Abrams, who defended NBC, criticized Newton's lawyer for
omitting a damaging piece of evidence on direct examination of his
client:' 8 in response to questions from an NBC journalist, Newton
had denied speaking to a particular organized-crime figure within
the past year when in fact he had done so on several occasions. 9
Abrams faulted Newton's counsel for omitting this harmful fact on
direct examination, thus allowing Abrams to raise it on cross-exami-
nation.2" In so doing, Newton's lawyer had acted exactly as spon-
sorship theory recommends. 2' Abrams is therefore correct in
advancing the case as a test of our theory. Indeed, the case is partic-
ularly useful because it raises this tactical dilemma in the context of
the key witness-the plaintiff himself. If ever the conventional wis-
dom in favor of volunteering weaknesses were to govern, this would
be a classic occasion.
Abrams presumably selected the Newton trial because it was the
best example from his personal experience to support his attack on
sponsorship theory and its proponents.22  Notably, however,
Abrams actually lost the Newton trial, although he was said to have
had "a very strong case. "23 In fact, the jury award to Newton of
$19.2 million was reportedly the largest in the history of libel law.2 a
17. See John A. Jenkins, Newton's Law: How Mort Galane Fought NBC and Won, A.B.A.
J., Apr. 1989, at 71 (noting that Abrams was "inexperienced with juries").
18. Abrams, supra note 6, at 1172.
19. "In response to questions from [the NBC journalist], Newton falsely stated that
he had last spoken with Penosi [an alleged organized-crime figure] 'maybe a year ago'
and that Penosi had made no phone calls to him." Newton, 930 F.2d at 677.
20. Abrams, supra note 6, at 1174.
21. Consistent with sponsorship theory, Newton's lawyer chose not to introduce
harmful evidence. Sponsorship Strategy argues that an advocate's introduction of such evi-
dence normally only magnifies its harmful impact. KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 1, at
86. The jury will assume that such an advocate is conceding the materiality of such
evidence. Id.
22. It should be noted that one of the proponents faulted by Abrams for "evident
confusion" was the late Robert Hanley. Abrams, supra note 6, at 1159 & n.3, 1160.
Hanley was the winner of "one of the largest jury] awards ever recorded"--a $1.8 bil-
lion verdict in MCI's antitrust action against AT&T. Bruce Lambert, Robert Hanley, 67,
Trial Lawyer: AT&T Antitrust Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, at A38. See MCI Com-
munications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
23. Jenkins, supra note 17, at 71.
24. See, e.g., Court Hears Appeal of $5.3 Million Libel Award to Wayne Newton, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 1990, at 17 (reporting that the $19.2 million jury award-reduced by remittitur
to a $5.3 million judgment-was believed to be the largest libel award in history); see also
Jenkins, supra note 17, at 76 (noting that the libel verdict was "the largest ever rendered
against a news organization"). Abrams's explanation that an appellate court later over-
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Undoubtedly, the proponents of conventional wisdom would
argue that the decision by Newton's lawyer not to disclose the harm-
ful matter himself might have harmed him in the jury's eyes,"
thereby preventing an even larger recovery. Post-trial interviews of
the jurors, however, revealed that Newton's lawyer, far from having
alienated the jury, made a very favorable impression. As noted in
The American Lawyer, "In the matchup between lawyers, the jurors
favored [Newton's counsel Morton] Galane hands down. 'Galane
was like dynamite,' says [onejuror]."'26 The jurors' remarks are con-
sistent with a central teaching of Sponsorship Strategy: that "the jury
does not expect an advocate to go out of his way to present evidence
harmful to his case. .. [and] will not view him as unfair if he fails to
do so. "27 Far from undermining sponsorship theory, the Newton
case is an attestation to its effectiveness.2 8
A second case example advanced by Abrams to "test" sponsor-
ship theory's teaching on harmful evidence was the Jean Harris case,
which arose from the murder of Dr. Herman Tarnower, the "Scar-
sdale Diet Doctor."' 29 Abrams recounted how, on direct examina-
tion, Harris's counsel chose not to elicit the contents of a damaging
letter sent by Harris to the victim, although he did introduce a
number of other letters that Harris had written to Dr. Tarnower °
turned the verdict, Abrams, supra note 6, at 1174 n.44, is irrelevant to the issue here-
whether the tactics of Newton's lawyer were effective in persuading the jury.
25. See, e.g., LEONARD DECOF, ART OF ADVOCACY: OPENING STATEMENT § 1.18, at 1-
43 (1987) ("[Y]ou must not... leav[e] out some critical weakness you know [your oppo-
nent] will raise, lest you dispel the notion of fairness you have worked so hard to
establish.").
26. Diane Goldner, How Wayne Newton's Theme Song Came True in His Record $19.2 Mil-
lion Libel Verdict Against NBC: "Danke Shoen, " Las Vegas, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Mar.
1987, at 76.
27. KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 1, at 101.
28. We also note that Abrams assumed that the wisdom of volunteering weaknesses
may be proved by pointing to the damage inflicted on Newton when the negative infor-
mation came to light during cross-examination. Abrams, supra note 6, at 1179. Abrams,
however, never considered the alternative damage that would have been caused had the
same negative fact been elicited during direct examination.
29. See People v. Harris, 445 N.Y.S.2d 520 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), aff'd, 442 N.E.2d
1205 (N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1047 (1983). Jean Harris, the headmistress of the
Madeira School in McLean, Virginia, was convicted of murdering her paramour, Dr.
Herman Tarnower, the author of a best-selling diet book. Id. at 523.
30. Abrams, supra note 6, at 1169-70.
[T]he defense introduced several letters [Harris] had written to Tarnower in
1978 and 1979 to show her state of mind-that she had accepted Tarnower's
affairs with other women, yet remained devoted to him .... One key letter,
however, the defense expressly chose not to introduce. In fact, the defense not
only declined to introduce the letter (which came to be known as the "Scarsdale
letter"), but went to great lengths to exclude it from the trial, and only pro-
1993]
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Abrams criticized this decision-and sponsorship theory's supposed
endorsement of it-claiming that introduction of the damaging let-
ter by Harris's counsel on direct would have lessened its adverse
impact.3 '
Abrams's use of this example, however, is inherently flawed.
He implicitly assumes that Harris's counsel was correct in introduc-
ing the earlier letters to show the defendant's state of mind.12 By
introducing letters written as many as two years prior to the date of
the murder, however, the defense counsel conceded the materiality
of the harmful letter, which was posted by the defendant on the day
of the killing.33 This last letter was plainly more probative of her
mental state on the day in question. One who practices according to
sponsorship theory would most likely not have introduced any of
the letters. Thus, the particular dilemma presented by Harris-
whether to introduce the harmful letter, having already introduced
others-is not one that an advocate using sponsorship theory would
face.
In addition, Sponsorship Strategy nowhere advises that an advo-
cate should always refrain from volunteering a negative piece of evi-
dence. Indeed, the book explains at length various situations in
which an advocate could be harmed by omitting such a fact.34 The
book instructs that "[w]here items of evidence fall naturally into a
series or other grouping, omitting one item from the series because
it is harmful may result in very high costs of apparent efforts to
omit."" For example, if in a rape case, the police take four semen
tests, three of which are helpful and one of which is not, an attorney
should not introduce only the three and omit the damaging one.
While Abrams wrote that "ignoring the letter on direct ... is pre-
duced it when forced to comply with an order of the ChiefJustice of Westches-
ter County.
Id.
31. Id. at 1172 ("The defense's failure even to seek to lessen [the letter's] impact in
advance-by giving Harris the opportunity on direct to explain the pain she felt when
she wrote the letter-was a gross miscalculation. Yet, th[is] ... is precisely the approach
counseled by Klonoff and Colby.").
32. See id. at 1169-72.
33. See Harris, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 530; KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 1, at 28-30. We
suggest that "where the advocate goes to the effort of introducing evidence that is infer-
ior to other evidence that he has introduced, the jury is apt to assume that he views the
inferior evidence as materially favoring his case." Id. at 30.
34. Such situations may occur when it is necessary to fill a "conspicuous gap," when
a witness has a particular relationship to a party and when "a witness would almost
certainly include a harmful fact when candidly describing an incident in everyday con-
versation .... See KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 1, at 91-94.
35. Id. at 91.
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cisely the approach counseled by Klonoff and Colby,"'3 6 Sponsorship
Strategy actually counsels that, if the helpful letters are introduced,
the damaging one might have to be introduced as well.3' Abrams's
use of the Harris example to discredit sponsorship theory is unavail-
ing for this reason as well.
A third example advanced by Abrams was the Alger Hiss perjury
prosecution.3 8 In that case, the government's first effort at trial
ended in a hung jury.3 9 Abrams presents the first trial as an exam-
ple of an instance where a prosecutor suffered because he failed to
expose the prior perjuries before Congress and a grand jury of his
own star witness, Whittaker Chambers.4 ° Basically, Abrams would
have had the attorney impeach his own witness. In fact, however,
the prosecuting attorney did elicit these matters himself, albeit not
at the length Abrams would have liked.4 Because the prosecutor
did so, the defense attorney was able to capitalize on the prosecu-
tor's sponsorship of the prior false statements by reminding the jury
during cross-examination that his opponent-the attorney whose
goal was to put forward the government's strongest case-had
raised those damaging statements. 42 This example is therefore no
test of sponsorship theory, which generally counsels against the im-
peachment of one's own witnesses altogether.4 3
36. Abrams, supra note 6, at 1172.
37. KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 1, at 91-92. We warned that when a potentially
damaging item fits naturally within evidence already being offered, "omission of the
item ... will attract greater attention to the item than it would otherwise have merited."
Id. at 92 (noting also that in these circumstances "[tihejury's perception that the advo-
cate took pains to conceal the fact might only highlight its significance").
38. Abrams, supra note 6, at 1165-69. See United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951).
39. Alger Hiss, a respected Washington lawyer, was accused of being a member of an
underground cell of the Communist Party. Hiss denied the allegation before both the
House Committee on Un-American Activities and a federal grand jury. Hiss, 185 F.2d at
824, 828. In his first trial on perjury charges, the jury deadlocked. Id. at 824.
40. Abrams, supra note 6, at 1166, 1168.
41. As Abrams noted, the prosecutor himself asked Chambers if he had disclosed his
possession of damaging documents during his testimony before Congress and the grand
jury. Chambers responded by stating that, though he could not remember whether he
had been asked at these hearings about the documents, he would have lied about them.
Id. at 1166.
42. See id. at 1167 ("Mr. Chambers, I think two days ago you told us that you had
committed perjury before the grand jury in October of last year, is that right?" (quoting
the Hiss trial transcript)).
43. See KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 1, at 86-87. Abrams encourages lawyers to bury
harmful facts when eliciting them on direct examination. See Abrams, supra note 6, at
1163 (citing MAUET, supra note 2, at 86). Ironically, Abrams himself tried to bury in a
footnote the fact that he lost the Newton trial. See id. at 1174 n.44.
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A final point to be made with respect to the first Hiss trial is that
the prosecutor questioned his witness in detail about other harmful
matters in an effort to have the witness "admit the worst about his
checkered history, thereby preempting the defense from exposing
[the witness's] defective past."'4 4 This, too, is the conventional wis-
dom's approach. 45 Thus, if the hung jury in the first trial proves
anything, it is that the conventional wisdom falls short of its own
goals. As Abrams himself acknowledged, the prosecutor did not
employ the sponsorship tactic of avoiding impeachment of one's
own witness altogether.46
With respect to the retrial of Alger Hiss, Abrams suggested that
a conviction was secured because the prosecutor elicited the facts
relating to the perjuries in greater detail.47 Yet this is not a sound
basis for assessing the verdict because, in that trial, neither side fo-
cused on the credibility of the prosecution's witness.48 While the
prosecutor in the first trial had conceded in his opening statement
that the government would have "no case" unless the jury believed
Chambers, 49 no such concession was made in the retrial. To the
contrary, in the second case the prosecutor emphasized that the de-
fendant's crime would be proved by "the immutable documents
themselves, documents that just can't change."5 Likewise, the de-
fense "did not stress Chambers' credibility, [but] instead . . . called
the documents the central issue in the case."' 5 1 Accordingly, if the
verdict in the Hiss retrial tests anything, it is the quality of the docu-
mentary evidence rather than the credibility of the government's
witness when he was more comprehensively impeached by his own
lawyer.52 Perhaps this is why Abrams ended his lengthy discussion
44. Abrams, supra note 6, at 1166.
45. See MARK A. DOMBROFF, DOMBROFF ON DIRECT AND CROSS EXAMINATION 7 (1985)
("The obvious advantage [of impeaching one's own witness] .. .is that new matters are
not raised out of the mouths of your witnesses under questioning by your opponent.").
46. See Abrams, supra note 6, at 1169 n.30 (admitting that the prosecutor's tactic in
the first trial "involved more disclosure to the jury than Kionoff and Colby favor").
47. Id. at 1169 n.31 ("Most importantly, [the prosecutor] addressed the issue of
Chambers' acknowledged perjuries, and disclosed the details of Chambers' inconsistent
testimony.").
48. See id.
49. Id. at 1166 ("Assistant U.S. Attorney Thomas Murphy conceded in his opening,
'[I]f you don't believe Chambers then [the government] has no case ....'" (citing the
first Hiss trial transcript)).
50. Id. at 1169 n.31 (quoting the second Hiss trial transcript).
51. Id.
52. In fact, reliance on a comparison of the retrial verdict to the first one for any
purpose relating to selection of evidence is unwarranted, due to the tactical error com-
mitted by the prosecutor in the first case of explicitly conceding that he had "no case"
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of the case by curiously conceding that it is "impossible to know"
whether the prosecutor's tactics in the first case were correct. 53
In sum, all three cases marshalled by Abrams fail to cast doubt
upon sponsorship theory. Ultimately, Abrams found that he must
also come to this conclusion.54 His reliance on cases that were at
best inconclusive is truly mystifying. His analysis certainly did not
justify his angry denunciation of our theory.
The problems with Abrams's review go well beyond his puz-
zling reliance on these cases. In mounting his attack on our theory,
Abrams overlooked major portions of the book. For example, with
respect to the selection of witnesses, Abrams maintained that the
book "goes too far" by "providing false comfort to litigators" re-
garding the risks associated with not calling a witness. 55 He criti-
cized the book for supposedly asserting that "there is no risk that
opposing counsel will use a counsel's failure to call a somewhat
weak but still supportive witness to suggest that the witness was not
called because her testimony would have been harmful."' 56 Sponsor-
ship Strategy, however, provides a detailed analysis of precisely this
risk; the greater part of Chapter Five is devoted to the selection of
evidence in light of this risk.57 The concept designed to account for
this risk-"party-associated evidence"-is referred to throughout
the book.5"
Specifically, the book states that there is such a risk when the
witness in question is "party-associated." 59 A witness is party-asso-
unless the jury believed his star witness. In Sponsorship Strategy, we warn against convey-
ing the impression that one is "relying on any particular piece of evidence to win." See
KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 1, at 257.
53. Abrams, supra note 6, at 1169.
54. See id. at 1174 ("It is difficult, based on the Hiss, Harris, and Newton cases, to offer
any broad conclusions about the tactical desirability of counsel bringing out unfavorable
information about his witness on direct examination.").
55. Id. at 1161.
56. Id.
57. See KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 1, at 121-37. Chapter Five is entitled: "Selec-
tion of Evidence: Undisputed Issues and Party-Associated Evidence."
58. See, e.g., id. at vii-viii, 14, 66 n.5, 78 n.26, 80 n.30, 85 n.33, 111-12, 119, 121-37,
140, 144, 146-47, 152-53.
59. Id. at 126. There we explain:
[W]e [previously] discussed a risk that may arise when an advocate omits evi-
dence from his presentation .... [namely], that the jury ... will speculate that
such evidence would have harmed the advocate's case. This risk does not arise
where the evidence is also available for the opponent's use ....
This is not true in the case of party-associated evidence. Here, the jury has
no logical basis for inferring from the opponent's omission of the evidence that
it would have failed to benefit his case.
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ciated if she is perceived by the jury "to be in [one] advocate's
'camp.' "60 Often, such a witness is biased in favor of one side and
not likely to cooperate with the opponent's lawyer.6 ' Alternatively,
information concerning the witness's whereabouts could be in one
party's exclusive custody.62 For either reason, the other party is not
expected to call the witness. 63 Therefore, the book points out that a
lawyer may damage her case by omitting a party-associated witness.
Such an omission carries with it the risk that the jury will penalize
the party identified with the witness for not producing her.'
Abrams overlooked the fact that we do give substantial consideration
to this risk.
Abrams provides an example to support his criticism, but that
example itself only underscores how he overlooked Sponsorship Strat-
egy's treatment of the foregoing risk. In particular, Abrams de-
scribed a situation in which counsel for a defendant-employer in an
employment discrimination case must decide whether to call a for-
mer employee as a witness. 65 He charged that our book is "mislead-
ing" for not acknowledging that, in such a case, failure to call the
witness entails serious risks. 66 A number of factors, however, could
render such a witness "party-associated." These factors would alert
the lawyer who properly applies sponsorship theory to analyze pre-
cisely the risk that Abrams claims we ignore. Sponsorship theory
would advise the lawyer to ask herself various questions: Does the
former employee still receive a pension or other company benefits,
thus rendering him reluctant to testify against the company? Is the
employee a former high-level official who is still perceived as loyal
60. Id. at 121.
61. Id. at 122 ("[A] party-associated witness.., would, in the jury's mind, be likely to
go out of his way to help that side. The jury is apt to assume that such a witness is not
likely to have submitted to pretrial interviews with the opponent's investigators. It is
further apt to believe that, even if the witness were to have granted such an interview, he
probably would have been uncooperative.").
62. Id. (referring to the situation "where the jury preconceives that information con-
cerning the witness is in one party's exclusive custody").
63. Id. at 121 ("The key characteristic of party-associated evidence is the jury's pre-
conception that it is not fully available to the opponent despite the opponent's physical
access to it.").
64. Id. ("[A]n advocate's usual insurance policy in refraining from introducing evi-
dence is the argument that the opponent could have introduced the evidence .... [Flor
evidence that is party-associated, such an argument will not be apt to satisfy the jury.").
See also id. at 126 ("[Blecause the jury preconceives that party-associated evidence is not
equally available, the rule of evidence selection must take into account the risk of ad-
verse jury speculation that arises when an advocate omits such evidence.").
65. See Abrams, supra note 6, at 1161.
66. See id.
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to her former employer? Are there enduring friendships between
the former employee and current company personnel? Affirmative
answers to questions such as these could trigger the special consid-
erations that are applicable to party-associated evidence and explic-
itly designed to account for the risk from nonproduction Because
Abrams ignored this lesson taught in Sponsorship Strategy and thereby
misapplied the theory, his criticism that the book "goes too far" and
"provides false comfort to litigators ' '16 has no credibility.
In concluding his review, Abrams also found our book's advice
"troubling" on ethical grounds.69 Specifically, he deemed it "dis-
turbing" that application of its tactics might result in "a jury [being]
deprived of relevant information," and charged that "[z]ealous ad-
vocacy is the only name of [the authors'] game."' 70 But such advo-
cacy is an integral part of the adversary system, as reflected in a
lawyer's ethical obligation to "represent his client zealously within the
bounds of the law."-71 And nowhere did Abrams propose to replace
the adversary system with its alternative, the inquisitorial system.72
Ironically, Abrams's own loss in the Newton case shows the dangers
of straying from zealous advocacy. At least one juror in the Newton
case "interpreted Abrams's low-key delivery to mean 'Abrams didn't
believe in his clients enough.' -71 By contrast, our theory instructs
that arguments "must never be delivered half-heartedly" because
67. See KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 1, at 121-27.
68. Abrams, supra note 6, at 1161.
69. Id. at 1175-76.
70. Id. At the same time, he acknowledged that a lawyer is under no obligation to
disclose to the jury evidence harming his case. Id. at 1176 n.49. Even the rule demand-
ing that prosecutors disclose exculpatory evidence merely requires them to reveal such
evidence to opposing counsel, not to the trier of fact. Id.
71. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 7-1 (1971) (emphasis added).
See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. (1992) ("A lawyer should
act . . . with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."). The lawyer's duty of zealous
representation guarantees the litigant's "right to present his case in the best light possi-
ble," a right inherited from ancient Greek justice. See GEORGE KENNEDY, THE ART OF
PERSUASION IN GREECE 23 (1963). This right is a cornerstone of the adversary system.
See EDMUND M. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYS-
TEM OF LITIGATION 3 (1956) ("The theory of our adversary system of litigation is that
each litigant is most interested and will be most effective in seeking, discovering, and
presenting the materials which will reveal the strength of his own case and the weakness
of his adversary's case.").
72. In contrast to the adversary system, the inquisitorial system emphasizes the sys-
tem's interests and not those of individual litigants. See generally STEPHAN LANDSMAN,
THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 49-50 (1984).
73. Goldner, supra note 26, at 76. See also Jenkins, supra note 17, at 76 ("[Alt least
one of the jurors thought Abrams' placidity was an indication that he didn't believe in
his clients.").
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that approach "communicat[es] a lack of belief' in one's case.74 In
the end, if Abrams's comments raise any concerns, they are his own
condemnation of zealous advocacy and his apparent reluctance to
practice it.
II.
The second reviewer, Professor Michael Saks, has written ex-
tensively on empirical testing of jury behavior.75 Although his re-
view of Sponsorship Strategy canvassed the literature on such empirical
studies,76 that literature is as inconclusive against sponsorship the-
ory as were Abrams's three case examples. Indeed, Saks himself de-
clared that sponsorship "might turn out to be a valid and powerful
theory."' 77 After exhaustively analyzing the empirical literature, he
concluded that "there is no evidence that conventional wisdom pro-
vides better results in trials."78 Saks thus made the far more eso-
teric claim that, whatever merit sponsorship theory might have on a
practical level, as a theory of "behavioral science" it is methodologi-
cally flawed.79
Saks's first methodological criticism was that sponsorship the-
ory is "upside-down" because "it is deductive when it should be in-
ductive."80 In particular, Saks observed, the theory "begins with
general principles from which it derives assertions about specific
phenomena, instead of beginning with well-established phenomena
of persuasion and then developing an abstract theory to explain
them." 8 ' In essence, Saks charged that the theory asserts more
74. KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 1, at 247.
75. See, e.g., Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992) (reviewing "the existing
empirical evidence on the behavior of the tort litigation system" and demonstrating "the
inadequacy of that evidence for drawing trustworthy conclusions"); Michael J. Saks, En-
hancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1988, at
243 (analyzing social-psychological empirical data on juries); Michael J. Saks, Blaming the
Jury, 75 GEo. L.J. 693 (1986) (Book Review of VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING
THE JURY (1986)).
76. See Saks, supra note 7, at 1187-90.
77. Id. at 1186.
78. Id. at 1190 n.65.
79. Id. at 1182.
80. Id. at 1181. See also id. at 1182 & n.23 (criticizing sponsorship theory for "ap-
pear[ing] on the scene" at the deductive "stage" and for "exempt[ing] itself" from the
earlier stage of "induction"); id. at 1186 n.42 (faulting sponsorship theory for being
"deductive before it is inductive").
81. Id. at 1181. See also id. at 1190 (acknowledging the absence of theoretical princi-
ples in the study of trial practice and insisting that "the more fundamental element lack-
ing .. . is systematic evidence about what works and what does not").
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than could possibly be justified by the empirical data used to con-
struct it.
s2
While Saks chastised us for supposedly lacking the "tools" of
science," he is the one who is out of touch with accepted scientific
methodology. As philosopher Stephen Toulmin observed: "It is
natural for a logician to suppose that, in order to justify a theoretical
conclusion, one must collect sufficient experimental material to en-
tail it; and that, if one does anything less, the theoretical conclusion
will assert something more than the experimental data warrant. 84
As Toulmin also observed, however, following that position is "mis-
taken." 5 Professor Saks is guilty of this error. In particular, to be
correct, a theory need not have been created by generalizing from
pre-existing empirical data,8" and Saks's criticism on this point is
therefore unfounded.
More generally, Saks fails to appreciate the role of deductive
theorizing in the scientific discovery process. The method based on
such theorizing, known as the "hypothetico-deductive method,"'87
proceeds from the premise that meaningful data cannot normally be
collected in the absence of a theory.8 8 For that reason, not only is
82. See id. at 1178 n.4 ("Rigorous inferences can be drawn only from a far more
systematic... gathering of data than goes on in the conventional practice of law."); id. at
1182 ("[T]heorizing ... cannot begin in earnest until some empirical data have been
collected."); id. at 1186 ("A positive theory built without an empirical foundation is [not]
likely to provide useful guidance ....").
83. Our "mistakes," Saks explained, "are perfectly natural for lawyers to make." Id.
at 1181. The reason is that lawyers are trained in "normative" matters but not in "posi-
tive" ones. Id. at 1181-82. According to Saks, while Sponsorship Strategy embarked on "a
task .. .of basic and applied behavioral science, the authors work with the only tools
they know, and those are the wrong ones for the job." Id. at 1182.
84. STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 42 (1953).
85. Id.
86. Id. ("For ... our theoretical statements ... neither could be nor need to be
entailed by [the data], being neither generalizations from them nor other logical con-
structs out of them, but rather principles in accordance with which we can make infer-
ences about phenomena.").
87. See, e.g., PETER MEDAWAR, INDUCTION AND INTUITION IN SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT 45
(1969).
88. See, e.g., Karl Popper, The Myth of Inductive Hypothesis Generation, in ON SCIENTIFIC
THINKING 72 (Ryan D. Tweeney et al. eds., 1981) ("[T]he belief that we can start with
pure observations alone, without anything in the nature of a theory, is absurd ....
[T]hough beetles may profitably be collected, observations may not."); THOMAS KUHN,
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 15 (Otto Neurath et al. eds., 2d ed. 1970) (not-
ing that in the absence of a theoretical framework, "all facts ... seem equally relevant,
... [making] early fact-gathering... [a] nearly random activity"); id. at 135 (noting that
measurements undertaken without a theoretical framework "seldom lead to any conclu-
sions at all"); IRVING COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 389 (3d ed. 1968) ("[lIt is strictly
impossible to make any serious attempt to collect evidence unless one has theorized
beforehand.").
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the deductive method permissible, but also the alternative urged by
Saks-the inductive method-is widely considered ineffective in
generating scientific discoveries when it is unassisted by deductive
theory.8 9
To be sure, as a means of arriving at scientific theory, the induc-
tive method is superficially appealing. Scientific textbooks often
take the following deductive form:90 "lawlike" statements and hypo-
thetical "initial conditions" are fed into a hopper on a machine; a
crank is turned, causing the appropriate logical and mathematical
operations to be internally performed; and numerical predictions
then emerge from the machine. 9' These predictions are set forth in
a column and compared with the results of empirical measure-
ments.92 This manner of presentation makes it tempting to believe
that one could merely collect the data first, then-purely by means
of induction-work in reverse to establish the laws. However, be-
cause one first needs a theory to know exactly what phenomena to
measure,9" it is considered an "outworn belief" to hold that a the-
ory's laws can be derived by "running the machine backwards." 94
Viewed in the most charitable light, Saks's methodological con-
ceptions are anchored in what has been called "the second period"
of the history of modern science. 95 This period was one of "militant
empiricism" where "hypotheses [were] frowned upon [and] experi-
mentation and derivation from observational results [were] re-
garded as the only legitimate manner of obtaining knowledge."96
89. See, e.g., CARL G. HEMPEL, FUNDAMENTALS OF CONCEPT FORMATION IN EMPIRICAL
SCIENCE 36 (Otto Neurath et al. eds., 1952) ("The entire history of scientific endeavor
appears to show that . . .comprehensive, simple, and dependable principles for the
explanation and prediction of observable phenomena cannot be obtained by merely
summarizing and inductively generalizing observational findings.").
90. The deductive mode of presentation has been the norm in science at least since
publication of Nbwton's Principia. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON RHETORIC AND
BELLES LETrRES 140 (John M. Lothian ed., 1963) (observing that the deductive method
of theory presentation was pioneered in the natural sciences by Descartes and perfected
by Newton); A.C. Crombie, From Rationalism to Experimentalism, in ROOTS OF SCIENTIFIC
THOUGHT 131 (Philip P. Wiener & Aaron Nolan eds., 1957) ("[Gleometrical demonstra-
tion ... was the basis not only of [the ancient Greeks'] considerable contributions to
mathematics itself and to physical sciences like astronomy and geometrical optics, but
also much of their biology and medicine.").
91. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION 182 (1977).
92. See id. at 181-82.
93. See supra note 88.
94. KUHN, supra note 91, at 183.
95. See Paul Feyerabend, Problems of Microphysics, in PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE TODAY
138 (Sidney Morgenbesser ed., 1967) (providing a short account of the history of sci-
ence since 1600).
96. Id. at 138-39.
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Whatever vitality this view might have had at the close of the 19th
century, it was dealt a death blow by Einstein's announcement of the
theory of relativity. 97 Because that theory explained the same em-
pirical facts as Newton's mechanics while using a radically different
conceptual foundation, it demonstrated the "fictitious" character of
fundamental principles and the fact that they are "free inventions of
the human mind." 98 In addition, it exposed the error of assuming
that a single correct theory will inexorably result from mechanistic
induction.99
Saks's criticism of our theory for being "deductive when it
should be inductive' 0 0 at best rests, therefore, on overthrown
methodological principles.' 0 ' Interestingly, Saks's criticism parrots
the repudiated complaint of many 19th-century laypersons against
Darwin's Origin of Species. Presaging Saks, the "popular view" ad-
vanced in "the non-scientific press of the time" was that the work
was flawed because it was "deductive, not inductive."' 1 2 No matter
97. See id. at 139-40 (discussing the impact on the scientific community of the an-
nouncement of the theory of relativity). Compare ALBERT EINSTEIN, IDEAS AND OPINIONS
273 (Sonja Bargmann trans., 1954) ("The natural philosophers of [the 18th and 19th
centuries] were.., most of them possessed with the idea that the fundamental concepts
and postulates of physics ... could be deduced from experience by 'abstraction'-that is
to say, by logical means. A clear recognition of the erroneousness of this notion really
only came with the general theory of relativity ....") with Saks, supra note 7, at 1181
(criticizing Sponsorship Strategy for not "beginning with well established phenomena of
persuasion and then developing an abstract theory to explain them" (emphasis added)).
Cf. LESZEK KoLAKOWSKI, THE ALIENATION OF REASON: A HISTORY OF POSITIVIST
THOUGHT 139-40 (Norbert Guterman trans., Anchor Books 1969) (noting how the doc-
trine of conventionalism exposed the "fiction[] . . . according to which science is always
created by inferring alleged 'inductive laws' from alleged 'facts' ").
98. EINSTEIN, supra note 97, at 273.
99. See, e.g., Ernest Nagel, The Nature and Aim of Science, in PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
TODAY, supra note 95, at 10 (noting the "inadequacy" of "the popular view.., that a
scientific inquiry must begin by collecting facts, the data thus collected being then
pressed through some sort of logical sieve which finally yields a uniquely determined
formulation of a regularity between the events under study"); ALBERT EINSTEIN & LEO-
POLD INFELD, THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS: THE GROWTH OF IDEAS FROM EARLY CONCEPTS
TO RELATIVITY AND QUANTA 33 (1938) ("Physical concepts are free creations of the
human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external
world.").
100. Saks, supra note 7, at 1181.
101. Saks also appears to espouse the now-discredited view that scientific theories are
discovered, not invented. See David L. Hull, Charles Darwin and Nineteenth-Century Philoso-
phies of Science, in FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 115-
16, 120 (Ronald N. Giene & Richard S. Westfall eds., 1973) (describing the debate over
whether scientific theories are discovered or invented). Because Saks cited no relevant
authority for his view, however, it is unclear whether he was aware that the debate even
took place.
102. Alvar Ellegard, Darwin's Theory and Nineteenth Century Philosophies of Science, in
ROOTS OF SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT 537, 559 (Philip P. Wiener & Aaron Nolan eds., 1957).
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how Saks came upon this discredited chestnut, his prohibition of
deductive theorizing is more than mere error. It would, if followed,
most likely forever consign the field of trial advocacy to its present
"pre-scientific" condition. 0 3
This is the present state of trial advocacy: It abounds with pro-
positions that would be inconsistent if formulated explicitly °4 and
with rules that are articulated only vaguely, if at all.'0 5 Saks admit-
ted as much in acknowledging that the field lacks any overarching
theory.' 0 6 Because, as we have noted, meaningful experimentation
cannot be performed in the absence of a theory, 0 7 his ban on de-
ductive theorizing and insistence that it be preceded by inductive
data collection would virtually ensure that the field remain in its pre-
scientific state. ' 08
Saks's remaining criticisms also reflect his captivity in a bygone
methodological framework. First, he complained that, once we ar-
Cf. THOMAS H. HUXLEY, LECTURES AND ESSAYS 172 (1908) ("Critics ... who have never
determined a scientific fact in their lives by induction from experiment or observation,
prate learnedly about Mr. Darwin's method, which is not inductive enough, not Baco-
nian enough, forsooth, for them. But ... there are multitudes of scientific inquiries, in
which the method of pure induction helps the investigator but a very little way.").
103. A pre-scientific era is one in which the accumulated rules and knowledge are
articulated vaguely and never categorically because they are not offered for truly critical
analysis. See MARX WARTOFSKY, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT 63
(stating that pre-scientific knowledge is "a body of homely and ubiquitous truths that are
scarcely articulated for critical reflection, because they are so pervasive and well en-
trenched in our practical speech and behavior"); id. at 67 (noting that "the aim of sci-
ence [is] to be consciously and deliberately critical").
104. Compare, e.g., MAUET, supra note 2, at 276 ("Confronting [your] weaknesses has
... advantages.") with id. at 277 ("[Florce your opponent to argue his weaknesses . . .
thus] creating a negative impression.").
105. See, e.g, KENNEY F. HEGLAND, TRIAL AND PRACTICE SKILLS 19 (1978) (discussing
whether to volunteer a weakness on direct examination and advising: "If the story on
direct holds together as a unit, if the attack you foresee rests on collateral evidence or on
the demented mind of your opponent, then you may either anticipate or ignore.");
MAUET, supra note 2, at xix (noting that "there is no 'right way' to try cases").
106. See Saks, supra note 7, at 1190 (acknowledging Sponsorship Strategy's "sound con-
clusion" that the field ofjury trial practice lacks an overarching theory).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 85-94.
108. Cf. Letter of Charles Darwin to Henry Fawcett (Sept. 18, 1861), in 1 MORE LET-
TERS OF CHARLES DARWIN 194, 195 (Francis Darwin ed., 1903) ("About thirty years ago
there was much talk that geologists ought only to observe and not theorise; and I well
remember some one saying that at this rate a man might as well go into a gravel-pit and
count the pebbles and describe the colours. How odd it is that anyone should not see
that all observation must be for or against some view if it is to be of any service!").
Keeping this enlightened statement in mind, Saks's admission that "thousands of empir-
ical studies" have already been conducted over the past half-century in the field of per-
suasion cannot possibly help his thesis that more data collection is needed before
theorizing can begin. See Saks, supra note 7, at 1187.
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rived at the premises of our theory-sponsorship's assumptions of
how the jury reasons-we did not empirically test them.'0 9 Saks
erred, however, in supposing that a theory must be evaluated by
whether its assumptions are realistic. As Professor Milton Friedman
has written, "to suppose that ... the conformity of [a hypothesis's]
'assumptions' to 'reality' is a test of the validity of the hypothesis...
is fundamentally wrong and productive of much mischief."" O The
goal of the theorist is to "explain[] much by little . . . ."' Conse-
quently, the most significant theories will have assumptions that are,
as Einstein noted, conceptual inventions." 2 In this regard, such
constructs-as opposed to their predictive implications-cannot
and should not be subjected to empirical testing.' 13
As an adjunct to his attack on our theory's premises, Saks
sought to undermine them by charging that they were "built on...
109. Saks, supra note 7, at 1183. Saks repeatedly asserted that sponsorship theory's
assumptions are unsupported by empirical data. For example, he noted that the the-
ory's "essential propositions are assumptions made by its authors"; referred to our "as-
sertions about what juries assume [and] think"; charged that "the authors offer no direct
evidence to support their claim that juries in fact behave in the stated ways"; and grum-
bled that the theory "is not grounded in empirical generalizations about what persuades
jurors." Id. Similarly, he asserted that "[tihe authors offered no empirical evidence
about the extent to which juries process information as the theory assumes they do ... 
Id. at 1185.
Saks also suggested that our "assortment of quotations" from various sources were
designed to serve as "evidence of how jurors in fact evaluate and use information." Id.
at 1183-84. On the contrary, these quotations were used to indicate the breadth of phe-
nomena that sponsorship theory explains, which is a longstanding technique for demon-
strating the plausibility of a theory. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 90, at 140 ("It gives us a
pleasure to see the phenomena which we reckoned the most unaccountable, all deduced
from some principle ... and all united in one chain .... "); Letter from Charles Darwin
to F.W. Hutton (Apr. 20, 1861), in 1 MORE LETrERS OF CHARLES DARWIN, supra note 108,
at 183, 184 ("I believe that [my] view in the main is correct, because so many phenom-
ena can be thus grouped together and explained."). Saks himself appears to have unwit-
tingly succumbed to this technique. See Saks, supra note 7, at 1184 (acknowledging "the
essential plausibility of [sponsorship] theory").
110. MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology Of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS OF POSITIVE
EcONOMICS 14 (1953). See also Crombie, supra note 90, at 131 (noting the ancient Greek
conception of science as "deductions from indemonstrable principles" (emphasis added)).
111. Id.
112. See EINSTEIN, supra note 97, at 273 (noting "the fictitious character of fundamen-
tal [theoretical] principles"). See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 110, at 15 (stating that the
issue is "not whether [the assumptions] are descriptively 'realistic,' for they never are").
113. It is error to assume that whatever application this point may have in the physical
sciences, such as physics, it has none in the human sciences. For instance, regarding the
economic assumption of profit-maximization by a firm, Professor Friedman noted the
irrelevance of "whether businessmen do or do not in fact reach their decisions by con-
sulting schedules, or curves, or multivariable functions showing marginal cost and mar-
ginal revenue." FRIEDMAN, supra note 110, at 15. What is important, he observed, is
"the conformity to experience of the implications of [that hypothesis]." Id.
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guesses."1 4 Having arbitrarily decided upon these premises ofjury
reasoning, according to Saks, we then simply applied "logic" to
them to derive the theory's conclusions. 115 Criticizing a theory for
how it was supposedly created, however, conflicts with the principle
that what matters instead is the theory's merits." 6
Saks's assumption that our theory was created by guesswork is
also wrong. In creating a theory, the theorist begins with experi-
ence-based intuitions about what is relevant to the cause of the phe-
nomena in question.'17 At the beginning of the process, however,
no explanation exists for these intuitions. The next step is to sub-
ject these intuitions to rigorous analysis, with the goal of construct-
ing an all-embracing explanation of the phenomena. Along the way,
new terms and concepts are invented as the theorist gains a better
understanding of the phenomena."' If the process is successful,
universal propositions can be identified and formulated using the
newly invented terminology." 9
In formulating our theory of sponsorship, we considered doz-
ens of provisional theories and sub-theories and compared them to
our own trial experiences. Our premises regarding how the jury
reasons12 0 emerged through this process of theory invention. In ar-
riving at this system, we were not simply making up a theory out of
whole cloth, divorced from our real-world experience. Professor
Saks's misunderstanding again lies in the fact that the deductive
textbook presentation of a theory "does not show the way in which
114. Saks, supra note 7, at 1186.
115. See id. at 1178. Indeed, we are said to have "courageously followed [these] deri-
vations even to conclusions that are contrary to conventional, often unanimously en-
dorsed, wisdom." Id. at 1181. The inference is that we gave advice in the face of
personal misgivings simply because it followed from our premises.
116. See KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 31 (1959) ("The ques-
tion of how ... a new [scientific theory] occurs to a man ... is irrelevant to the logical
analysis of scientific knowledge.").
117. SeeJOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 561-62 (Elizabeth B.
Schumpeter ed., 1954) ("[Blefore embarking upon analytic work of any kind we must...
acquire 'intuitively' a preliminary notion of how [the phenomena in question] hang to-
gether or, in other words, of what appear from our standpoint to be their fundamental
properties.").
118. See HEMPEL, supra note 89, at 37 (noting that when developing a theory, "the
scientist has to invent a set of concepts-theoretical constructs, which lack immediate
experiential significance").
119. See id. at 36-37 (discussing how a theory helps "establish explanatory and predic-
tive connections between the data of direct observation").
120. KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 1, at 20 ("[T]he jury assumes that each advocate
will make every contention and introduce all available evidence that he believes will ma-
terially favor his case. At the same time, [it also assumes that the advocate will] seek to
accomplish the[se] tasks with minimum effort.").
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the matter [being] taught was discovered."' 12'
Finally, Saks proclaimed that sponsorship theory is "back-
wards" because it was announced prior to empirical testing of its
predictive propositions. 22 This criticism misunderstands the na-
ture of scientific theories. It has never been a requirement that a
theory's predictions-even ones with highly significant implica-
tions-be verified prior to announcement.' 23  Indeed, announce-
ment prior to testing has certain advantages, for it has traditionally
been those empirical tests conducted after, not before, announce-
ment of a theory, that have led to widespread acceptance. This ac-
ceptance emerges because the results of such testing could not
possibly have been "built into" the theory in its creation. 124 Profes-
sor Saks's criticism leaves a theorist with paltry alternatives: to hold
back the theory from publication, mentioning it only to close
friends, or to publish it in a book containing the legend, "Warning:
theory untested by empirical tests." When pushed to its inevitable
result, Professor Saks's criticism becomes absurd.
It should also be noted that we did in fact experiment with the
theory in numerous trials and achieved dramatic results.' 2 5 Fur-
thermore, we have never claimed that our own trial experience
establishes the theory by scientific standards.' 26 We welcome for-
121. Rene Descartes, Reply to the Second Set Of Objections, in 2 ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF
DESCARTES 49 (Haldane & Ross ed., 1955). Cf KUHN, supra note 91, at 180-81 (noting
that textbooks contain "the finished achievements of modern physical scientists" and
that "the textbook mode of presentation must inevitably be misleading").
122. See Saks, supra note 7, at 1181 ("When I say that sponsorship theory is back-
wards, I mean that its suggested applications precede the phenomena of persuasion
when it [sic] should follow them. A positive theory is ready for application only after it
has been empirically confirmed.").
123. If that were so, Einstein's theory of relativity, to cite a familiar example, would
forever have remained a secret. Few areas of Einstein's theory are even accessible to a
direct comparison with nature and, consequently, remain untested to this day. See
KUHN, supra note 88, at 26 ("[T]here are seldom many areas in which a scientific theory,
particularly if it is cast in a predominantly mathematical form, can be directly compared
with nature. No more than three such areas are even yet accessible to Einstein's general
theory of relativity.").
124. See KUHN, supra note 88, at 155 (noting that the unanticipated consequences of a
theory are especially persuasive when attempting to prove it because they have not been
"built into the new theory from the start").
125. See KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 1, at 11 (summarizing the authors' own success-
ful application of sponsorship theory and unsuccessful use of conventional methods of
trial advocacy).
126. In this regard, we stated only that our trial experiences "convince[d] us that the
chances for success at trial can be improved considerably by understanding and applying
sponsorship principles." KLONOFF & COLBY, supra note 1, at 11. For that reason, Saks's
criticism is unwarranted. Cf JOHN S. MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC 328 (Longman 1970)
(characterizing Darwin's Origin of Species as an "unimpeachable example of a legitimate
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mal testing of our theory and are confident that the results will sup-
port it.
III.
One might be justifiably puzzled that Abrams marshalled a mul-
timillion dollar trial defeat as proof of the asserted tactical errors of
the winning attorney. There is no cause, however, for puzzlement.
Notions developed in a pre-scientific era are characteristically
"taken for granted" and embraced "unreflective[ly]."' 12 7 In particu-
lar, Abrams grew up with the maxim that volunteering weaknesses is
a good idea. It is undoubtedly an integral part of his experience as a
litigator. If his reliance on the Newton case is any guide, however, he
probably considers cases in which he used the tactic as confirming
its wisdom, regardless of whether he won or lost. For that reason,
his "experience" is of little or no weight in assessing the merits of
sponsorship theory.
Professor Saks, for his part, voiced "intellectual" criticisms that
are more than a century out of date. Here again, there is no cause
for surprise. Because the field of trial advocacy is not grounded in
science, professors in that field have not been expected to keep
abreast of changes in scientific methodology. In a strange way,
therefore, although Abrams and Saks come from different vantage
points, they are united in how they both so fittingly reflect the primi-
tive state of trial advocacy.
Given the inability of either reviewer to locate evidence to un-
dermine sponsorship theory, the question arises as to why both are
so disturbed by it. We submit that the reason lies in the deductive
nature of the theory. In particular, what appears to have upset
Abrams most is the certitude with which our theory sets forth its
conclusions. 128 Yet, that is characteristic of any deductive system,
where conclusions follow necessarily from premises. Saks's displea-
sure with the deductive nature of the theory is, as we have noted,
explicit. Given his apparent unfamiliarity with the role of deduction
in theory formation, however, his discomfort is entirely understand-
able. Until academics and practitioners alike are willing to embrace
hypothesis" and observing that "[i]t is unreasonable to accuse Mr. Darwin (as has been
done) of violating the rules of Induction. The rules of Induction are concerned with the
conditions of Proof. Mr. Darwin has never pretended that his doctrine was proved. He
was not bound by the rules of Induction, but by those of Hypothesis.").
127. WARTOFSKY, supra note 103, at 63.
128. See Abrams, supra note 6, at 1161 (disparaging the "opinion letter quality assur-
ances" of Sponsorship Strategy).
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the deductive approach and not condemn it reflexively, the field of
trial advocacy will never advance beyond the futile proclamation
that there is no "right way" to try a case.
